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SUBDIVISIONS: CONDITIONS IMPOSED
BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
John Paul Hannat
"We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."
This warning by Justice Holmes is even more apropos today
than it was at the time it was originally declared by the great Justice. A good many areas within the State of California have undergone some amazing changes within the past ten years. Spurred on by
the population boom and the increasing demand for housing, the construction industry has experienced an era of unprecedented activity.
The result of this has been the rapid development of land into subdivisions and the creation of many difficult problems for local
governmental entities. Local government has been engaged in a
continual struggle in its attempts to insure that the expanding
suburbs will have adequate schools, roads, parks, shopping centers,
and flood control facilities. Unfortunately, in most areas, development has proceeded more rapidly than planning, and cities and
counties have been caught short, without adequate planning or without funds to put plans into effect. In an effort to keep ahead of the
developers, and as predicted by Justice Holmes, some local governments have resorted to taking private property without paying
compensation to the owner.
The problems of local government are easier to define than they
are to solve. It seems inevitable that demand will always exceed
supply where roads, parks, schools, shopping centers, and flood
control facilities are concerned. In spite of the fact that local tax
revenues are increasing at an alarming rate, it also would appear that
spending will always rise to keep pace with revenues, so that there
will never be sufficient tax money on hand to meet all current and
long term governmental obligations.
In recent years, the need for planning has become apparent to
most enlightened communities. Indeed, one might observe today that
most cities that are attempting to face up to these problems have
t B.A., 1954, LL.B., 1959, Stanford University; member, California
Bar, private
practice, Palo Alto, California.
1 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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reached the conclusion that the panacea for all of their ailments is
to adopt a general plan. One might even suggest that the status
symbol for an enlightened community is to purchase a general plan
from "planning experts." The credentials of these "experts," unfortunately, are sometimes of questionable value. The wisdom of
such an investment has more often than not been called into question by the apparently irresistible compulsion on the part of members of city councils to deviate from their general plan by making
exceptions for most controversial proposals.
It is also true that many cities find great difficulty in getting
their plans approved by the public. One of the real problems is the
need for public education. Most citizens tend to be more concerned
with higher taxes and larger governmental expenditures at the local
level than they are with obtaining necessary services, and as a result,
interest tends to lag behind need. As an example, flood control
districts find it extremely difficult to pass bond issues for flood control facilities in "dry years." The education of the public as to the
need for advanced planning in certain areas is a slow and painful
process. What should be done when an immediate need arises for
services or facilities which have been proposed in a long range plan
by a local governmental entity? Often the public is not ready to
accept the proposal, particularly when it will be footing the bill.
Should the government wait and tie its program to the availability of
funds, or should it proceed with the program in advance of general
public acceptance, basing its decision on the premise that the primary responsibility of government is to provide the facility at the
least expense to the public? Some cities, faced with this dilemma,
have chosen to proceed with plans even though funds are not available, and have had to devise means of obtaining property without
paying for it.
It is at this point that the proposed subdivision comes directly
to the fore. The basic issue is whether the subdivider can be required to provide land or funds for projects and improvements that
are not directly related to and for the exclusive benefit of the land
to be developed and its subsequent owners.
PAYMENT OF FEES

One method of accomplishing needed community development
has been to require the payment of fees by builders into general city
funds in return for the approval of subdivision maps or for the
granting of building permits. Since the haphazard or fortuitous
presentation of subdivision maps to a city council may not always
coincide with the needs of the city from a geographical standpoint,
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some cities prefer to use their power to approve subdivision maps
to acquire sufficient general unrestricted funds with which to carry
out their long range plans, rather than to require dedication of land
within a subdivision. In Kelber v. City of Upland,' a requirement
for the payment of $30.00 per lot to be placed in a park and
school site fund and $99.07 per acre to be placed in a subdivision
drainage fund as a condition of approval of a subdivision map was
held invalid. The fees exacted were to be used for improvements
anywhere in the city; use of such fees was not restricted to the subdivision from which the payment was exacted.
In Santa Clara County Contractors and Homebuilders Association v. City of Santa Clara,8 a requirement for the payment of a fee
of $25.00 for each dwelling unit or apartment unit proposed to be
constructed within a subdivision, to be deposited in a Capital Outlay Recreational Fund as a condition of approval of a subdivision
map, was held invalid. The Kelber and Santa Clara cases preclude
any levy for general city benefits as a condition precedent to map
approval. Under proper circumstances, a local ordinance may require the payment of a fee as a condition of approval of a subdivision map for the purpose of defraying the actual or estimated costs
drainage facilities for local or neighborhood drainage
of constructing
4
areas.
Definite conditions must be met before such fees can be imposed, including adoption of an ordinance which refers to the drainage factor of a pre-existing general plan, and a finding that the fees
are fairly apportioned within the local area. Payment of the fee is
based upon the sound premise that a subdivision should provide
drainage facilities which are necessary to protect the future inhabitants from flooding, but that reasonable limits should be placed
upon the requirements imposed by the city.
Can local government require payment of building permit fees
as an alternative or additional condition of the subdivider? The City
of Santa Clara ordinance provided for payment of a fee for approval
of a map and issuance of a building permit.' The Attorney General
has expressed the view that an ordinance requiring a fee of $30.00
per dwelling unit for issuance of a building permit for the purpose of
2 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
8 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965). Apparently the money was to

be used for permanent recreation facilities not necessarily within the area of the
subdivision map. The court said, "There was no contention that the money collected
" Id.
was used only in connection with the development of the residential area ...
at 579, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11543.5.

5 Santa Clara County Contractors & Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara,
232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965).
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providing revenue for recreational facilities is valid where the fee is
tied to the issuance of a building permit rather than the approval of
a subdivision map.' Some would probably question whether a fee in
excess of the reasonable cost of processing a building permit should
be approved.7 The Court in the Santa Clara case relied on the
Business and Professions Code, Section 11529 and Section 11543.5.
These sections limit the right of a city to require fees for examination of maps and construction of drainage facilities. In holding the
fees to be invalid as conditions for approval of a subdivision map,
the court specifically refrained from "discussing the correctness of"
the Attorney General's opinion that such fees would be valid if
limited to building permits.
ExCESSIVE

SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENT

REQUIREMENTS

Prior to the passage of Section 11543.5 of the Business and
Professions Code, the City of Concord entered into a contract with a
subdivider whereby the subdivider paid the total cost of increasing
the width and capacity of a drainage channel, although only onethird of the cost was properly attributable to that particular subdivision.8 The city agreed that two-thirds of the cost of the improvements would be exacted from subsequent subdividers as a condition
precedent to approval of their maps. One subdivider subsequently
had his map disapproved because of this failure to pay his portion
of the fees, paid the fees under protest and sued the city. The city
relied on Sections 11543 and 11544 of the Business and Professions
Code. These provisions permitted the city to require a subdivider
to construct facilities that would be used for the benefit of property
not in the subdivision. The city, however, was required to reimburse
the subdivider for such facilities and the contract must provide that
the city will collect from persons using such facilities a reasonable
charge for such use for the benefit of property not within the subdivision. Section 11543 had been amended in 1955 to add reference
to drainage facilities, and the court held that the 1955 amendment
could not be applied to the contract, which was executed in 1953.
The court made this comment:
[The manner of payment for the improvements] chosen by appellants

deprives those charged with two-thirds of the cost of the right to be
heard upon the important issue of the extent of benefit received by
them, and the proper allocation of costs, a right which would have
been theirs had a special assessment district been formed. It deprives
6 45 CAL. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 23 (1965).

7 Stickel & Human, Report of Committee on Zoning and Planning, 22 NIMLO
MUNIC. L. REv. 422 (1959).

8 Lawrence v. City of Concord, 156 Cal. App. 2d 531, 320 P.2d 215 (1958).

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 6

them also of the safeguard of competitive bidding as a means of determining the fair cost of the drainage structures. . . . We specifically
refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of the 1955 amendments. We do hold that, whatever the effect of those amendments, the
1953 statutes did not authorize the procedure here used, and the contract, therefore is unenforceable as against plaintiffs.9

Perhaps Section 11543.5 has provided a suitable alternative to Section 11543, thus avoiding a test of the constitutionality of the 1955
amendment.
The Attorney General has concluded that a sanitary district
has no right to require a subdivider to enter into a contract to install a sewer line larger than necessary for one subdivision in order
to serve other drainage areas likely to be annexed in the future.
However, a sanitary district and a subdivider may mutually contract
for that purpose. 10 Presumably, this would apply to approval of
subdivision maps by cities.
DEDICATION OF LAND

Some cities, finding plans ahead of funds, have resorted to the
requirement of dedication of subdivision land in return for subdivision map approval.
An example will serve to illustrate the problem as it has developed recently. Suppose that a builder proposes to subdivide ten
acres and develop 40 lots on said ten acres. The property is approximately 420 feet wide and 1,000 feet long, and was purchased
for $20,000 per acre. On the long side, the property line extends to
the center of a proposed 50 foot flood control channel which the
city has planned to build. This channel would accommodate the
water run-off that would be produced from a surrounding area of
ten square miles as the result of a storm having a frequency of
occurrence of once in fifty years.
Suppose further, that the city proposes that the builder dedicate
a portion of his property 25 feet wide and 1,000 feet long. This land
theoretically cost the subdivider approximately $12,000, which
amount he will lose if he gives in to the city. Additionally, the
dedication will result in a change in shape of the subdivision and
thereby decrease the number of lots the subdivider can create with
the remaining land. This may also increase his improvement costs.
The alternatives of the subdivider are as follows:
1. Hold the land until the city buys the channel or changes the
9 Id. at 535, 320 P.2d at 218.
10 28 CAL. Ors. Arr'Y GEN. 344 (1956).
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route of the channel (which will mean tying up his investment);
2. Dedicate the land and lose the $12,000 plus other expected
profit;
3. Litigate the question of the city's power to impose this condition.

In the typical case, the subdivider chooses the second alternative because he depends upon rapid turnover of his capital to survive in a highly competitive market. A builder cannot afford to
carry interest payments and taxes on land that is not being developed. The subdivider will usually reject litigation because his lawyer
cannot promise him speedy and effective relief. Such litigation involves further expenditure of money, to say nothing of incurring the
ill-will of the city.
A recent case filed in Santa Clara Superior Court" involved
a suit by a builder against a city and a flood control district to test
the validity of forced dedication of subdivision land required by a
city for use as a portion of a flood control channel planned by the
district. The plaintiff alleged that the city and the district had
agreed to cooperate in requiring plaintiff to dedicate portions of a
district flood control channel in order to get approval of a subdivision map. The Santa Clara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District was created by act of the State Legislature, and
the district was empowered to obtain land by "gift, devise, contract, [and] condemnation."' 2
The district has the power, upon referral of the problem by an
incorporated city, "to require the installation of drainage or flood
control improvements necessary and/or convenient for needs of the
zone, including but not limited to, residential, subdivision, commer,. This of
cial and industrial drainage and flood control needs ...
course does not give the district the authority to require dedication
of land. The plaintiff sought to have the actions of the city and the
district declared illegal and unconstitutional on the grounds that
they constituted deprivation of property without compensation. In
addition, plaintiff sued to recover money for five pieces of property,
dedication of which had been required, and alleged the values of
the properties to be in excess of $50,000. Demurrers to the complaint were overruled by the court and the case was settled prior to
11 Ripley Dev. Co. v. City of Sunnyvale & Santa Clara County Flood Control
& Water Conservation Dist., Civil No. 150677, Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Calif.,
Oct. 24, 1963.
12 CAL. WATER UNCODrFiED AcTs act 7335, § 5 (Deering 1962).
13 Ibid.
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trial in January, 1965. The plaintiff dismissed the suit and received
an undisclosed amount of cash from the defendant district in return
for quitclaim deeds to the areas which previously had been dedicated
to the city.
The leading case upholding the power of a city to require dedication of land as a condition precedent to the approval of a subdivision map is Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles. 4 In that case,
the conditions imposed by the city, and allowed by the California
Supreme Court, were the dedication of land for a street and the
setting aside of other land for landscaping. The court distinguished
between the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain
(which requires compensation) and the imposition of reasonable
restrictions upon a land owner seeking to acquire the advantages of
subdivision. The holding was that reasonable restrictions of private
interests for the benefit of the community may be imposed, without
violating constitutional rights, where the land owner voluntarily
seeks subdivision. The Attorney General has narrowly construed
the Ayres case. He was asked whether an ordinance would be valid
which would require every subdivider either to donate school property within the subdivision or to pay the school district $50.00 for
each lot.15 The Attorney General concluded that this would be invalid. In a subsequent opinion, he explained that the Ayres case,
...properly may be limited to the actual context giving rise to it.
There, a chartered city was seeking to resolve a potentially serious
traffic problem, threatening the health and safety of both the residents of the subdivision and the rest of the community, by requiring
dedication of a street planting strip. We think it fair, therefore, to
say that the Ayres case stands as clear authority only for the proposition that the act does not preclude local regulations reasonably required by the subdivision type and related to the character of local
and neighborhood traffic, health and safety needs ....

Requiring dedication of land for school purposes surely cannot be
said to be a condition reasonably related to the character of local and
neighborhood traffic, health and safety needs. Accordingly, we reaffirm
our ruling ... that requiring dedication for such purposes constitutes
a condition going far beyond those conditions contemplated by the

Subdivision Map Act and which may be imposed consistent therewith.' 0
WARNING TO CITIES

Because the subdivider has to rely upon speedy approval from
cities of his subdivision maps in order to keep operating, and a
lengthy delay will certainly result from any attempt by the sub14 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). See also Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 503 (1950).
15 22 CAL. Ops. ATr'y GEN. 168 (1953).
16 29 CAL. Ops. Arr'y GEN. 49, 53 (1957). (Italicized in original.)
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divider to resist the requirements of dedication or payment of fees,
the cities would appear to occupy a power-laden position. Builders
are reluctant to take the city to court to test the reasonableness of
conditions imposed. That is why cities have been pursuing this method of accomplishing their planning goals at an ever increasing rate
and at the expense of the builders.
A comment of some interest appears in a report of the Committee on Zoning and Planning which was made up of many city
7
attorneys, and appeared in the 1959 Municipal Law Review. The
report discussed the practices of charging fees and requiring dedication of land as measures of subdivision control. The report states:
A practice has grown up around the subdivision process which from
a legal standpoint is disturbing. . . . Many planning boards and
governing bodies impose subdivision fees on land developers to cover
the cost of processing the application, including engineers' fees, etc.
As long as those fees are somewhere near commensurate with the cost
of processing, no trouble is likely to arise, and if so, the fees can be
justified. Many municipalities, looking for new sources of revenue and
mindful of the additional burden that land development causes by
way of additional municipal services, are by ordinance and otherwise
requiring outright conveyance of lands for schools, parks, etc., and in
lieu thereof, a cash payment to be dedicated to the construction of new
schools to serve the developments and the purchase of land for parks,
playgrounds and school sites ...
We are fearful, based upon an analysis of the cases reported to
date and general constitutional principles of law, that it is impossible
to sustain the imposition of fees or the requirement of dedication of
land for municipal projects and improvements which are not directly
related to and for the exclusive benefit of land developed and its subsequent owners.
Perhaps the outstanding case on this subject where the pros and
cons are fully discussed in the opinion is that of W. E. Gould & Co.
v. City of Park Ridge decided by the Circuit Court of Cook County,
January 15, 1958 .... The ordinance at issue in that case was cleverly
designed to try to constitutionally and fairly require developers to
contribute to the cost of future school construction precipitated by
the land development. A substantial amount of money had been
collected (over $100,000) but when the ordinance was tested, it fell,
first, because there was no statutory authority to permit the adoption
of such an ordinance, and secondly, because had there been, such
would have been unconstitutional as a violation of the 14th Amend18
ment of the United States Constitution.

The article goes on to state that the planning and advisory commission to the governor and legislature of the State of New Jersey
have tried without success to find a constitutional way of providing
Stickel & Human, supra note 7.
18 Id. at 427-428.
17

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 6

legislation to validate this practice. The committee then issues a
warning to municipalities adopting said practice not only as to its
constitutionality if attacked, but also to the possibility of being required to pay back enormous funds collected, appropriated, and
possibly spent prior to attack.
It should be noted that a 1965 amendment to California Business and Professions Code Section 11526 permits local ordinances
to provide for collection of a "proper and reasonable fee" from subdividers for examination of maps.
POWER OF CITIES TO REGULATE SUBDIVISIONS

Where do cities derive the power to impose conditions upon approval of subdivision maps? Certain conditions may be imposed
which are based upon the general powers of cities and counties, or,
like zoning ordinances, 19 are based upon statutes of equal dignity
with the Subdivision Map Act.2"
In a proper case, the police power may be used to take land
without payment of compensation. 2' However, the exercise of the
police power is properly confined to situations where an emergency
may be said to exist. Taking or damaging private property in construction of public improvements is not otherwise justified. 22
A chartered city has power under its charter and under the
State Constitution to enact legislation,2 3 and in the case of strictly
municipal affairs, local ordinances of a chartered city would prevail
over general state laws. However, in determining whether a matter
is a strictly municipal affair, the courts apparently decide, under the
facts of each case, whether the subject matter under discussion is of
municipal or state-wide concern. This question must be determined
from the legislative purpose in each individual instance.2 4
Certain powers have been delegated to cities to impose condi19 See Roney v. Bd. of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956).
In this case, the court stated that the extent of the authority of a governing body with
respect to approval of subdivision maps was set forth in the Subdivision Map Act, but
that the zoning ordinance of the county was based upon statutes of equal dignity with
the act and controlled the uses to which land could be put if no constitutional rights
were invaded.
20 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 11500-11641.
21 See 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 2025 (7th ed. 1960).

22 Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401 (1956);
Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
23 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6. This section empowers chartered cities to make and
enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to limitations contained in their own charters.
24 Professional Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384 P.2d
158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
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tions concerning design and improvement that are reasonably related
to the particular subdivision. 5 In addition, where there is no specific
limitation on the power of a city in its charter, and no provision in
the Subdivision Map Act forbids it, conditions may be lawfully
imposed so long as the requirements are reasonably related to the
character of the local neighborhood planning and traffic conditions. 6
SUBDIVISION MAP ACT

It seems clear that the legislature intended to occupy the field
of subdivision control in passing the Subdivision Map Act and that
it further intended to limit the authority of cities (including chartered
cities) to adopt local ordinances regulating subdivisions.2 7 Because
the State has pre-empted the field of subdivision regulation, local
municipal ordinances that conflict with the Subdivision Map Act are
invalid.2"
Among other things, the Subdivision Map Act regulates the
design and improvement of subdivisions, the survey data, the form
and content of tentative and final maps, and the procedure to be
followed in securing official approval of maps.29 Control of design
and improvement is vested in governing bodies of cities and counties,
and they are directed to adopt ordinances regulating and controlling
design and improvement 3
The problem here concerns the limitations of cities and counties
in controlling design and improvement of subdivision land. To be
determined is whether or not local government is acting in accordance with its delegation of authority as found in the Subdivision
Map Act.
The word "design" is defined by Business and Professions Code
Section 11510 as referring to street alignment, grades and widths,
alignment and widths of easements and rights-of-way for drainage
and sanitary sewers, minimum lot area and width, and certain
dedications.
§ 11525.
26 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). See
Taylor, Current Problems in California Subdivision Control, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 344
(1962).
27 Santa Clara County Contractors & Honebuilders Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara,
232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1965); Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
28 Professional Firefighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 384 P.2d
158, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1963).
29 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11526.
30 Ibid.
25 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
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Business and Professions Code Section 11511 defines "improvement" as referring to:
..
only such street work and utilities to be installed, or agreed to be
installed by the subdivider on the land to be used for public or private
streets, highways, ways, and easements, as are necessary for the general
use of the lot owners in the subdivision and local neighborhood traffic
and drainage needs as a condition precedent to the approval and
acceptance of the final map thereof.

A city has been permitted to require developers to execute an
agreement to install improvements consisting of a drainage ditch as

a condition to approval of a final subdivision map where the drainage facility was undoubtedly for the direct benefit of the subdivision
in question. The drainage ditch was found to be for the general use
of lot owners in the subdivision and for local drainage needs and was
essential to drain water accumulated on or falling on the land of the
subdivision, and to carry it therefrom to the main drainage channel. 1
Prior to approval of subdivision maps, it is customary for cities
to impose conditions in accordance with the "design and improvement" sections, such as construction and dedication of local streets,
storm sewers, street lighting, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, underground
utilities, street trees, and street signs. Subdividers accept these conditions without question and there is no doubt about their validity.
A city may also disapprove a tentative map because of flood
and inundation hazard, and may require protective improvements
to be constructed.12 Obviously, this would not include the power to
require dedication of land. In other words, the choice is between disapproving a map if flood hazards exist or requiring protective improvements to be constructed.
THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS

The power to require construction of improvements does not
mean that cities may impose excessive subdivision improvement requirements. For example, a requirement that a subdivider construct
part of a 50-foot flood control channel to obtain approval of a ten
acre subdivision would be no less objectionable than a requirement
of dedication of the land for that same portion of the channel.
The test applied by the courts to a condition imposed by a city
is the test of reasonableness, that is, are the conditions imposed
reasonably required in the interests of public safety and conve-

nience. 33
81 City of Buena Park v. Boyar, 186 Cal. App. 2d 61, 8 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1960).
82 'CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11551.5.
88 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).

1966]

SUBDIVISIONS

4 the Pennsylvania court
In Miller v. City of Beaver Falls,"
inquired:

Shall this principle relating to streets, which are narrow, well defined
and absolutely necessary, be extended to parks and playgrounds which
may be very large and very desirable but not necessary? . . .5
The city is not without a remedy, but it cannot eat its cake and
have its penny too. If it desires plaintiff's land for a park or playground
which it considers desirable or necessary for its future progress, it
can readily and lawfully obtain this land in accordance with the Constitution. ... All that is required is that just compensation be paid.... 86

The imposing of reasonable conditions of dedication upon a
property owner in return for the granting of a privilege has been
upheld under conditions not involving the subdivision of land. In
Bringle v. Board of Supervisors,8 7 the California Supreme Court
ruled that a required dedication of a 30-foot wide strip of land as a
condition for renewal of a variance to use property zoned for agricultural purposes as an equipment storage yard was permissible
where there was a reasonable relationship between the increased use
of the property and the widening of the street. Presumably, the issue
in this type of case would be the same as in cases arising under the
Subdivision Map Act, namely, whether the particular condition imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances. 8
LOCAL ZONING AND DEDICATION

Another technique that has been developed in recent times involves the practice of zoning property for low density (for example,
12,000 or 15,000 square foot residential lots). This zoning classification makes it difficult or impossible from an economic viewpoint
for a developer to profitably develop his land. The city leaves the
door open to the owner to come in and apply for some sort of planned
community zoning, and in a mutually arrived at arrangement the
city permits the builder to build on 6,000 or 8,000 square foot lots
in return for which the builder is required to dedicate certain choice
sites for schools and parks. Such arrangements are probably not
unconstitutional upon their face because the builder is receiving
something in exchange for his dedication of the land in that he is
368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
Id. at -, 82 A.2d at 36.
Id. at -, 82 A.2d at 38.
54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
See Taylor, Current Problems in California Subdivision Control, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 344 (1962); Schmandt, Municipal Control of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDIHA L.
REV. 637 (1961); Note, Dedication of Land in California, 53 CALIF. L. Rav. 559
84
85
86
87
38

(1965) ; Note, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New
Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
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permitted to build in much greater density on his remaining land
than he would have otherwise been able to do. It remains to be seen
whether the courts will have the insight to pierce through the form
to the substance here and see that in certain cases this amounts to
nothing more than a clever scheme to acquire property for public
use without payment of just compensation to the owner. Those
people responsible for such schemes argue that parks and schools
would tend to be used by the people residing in the particular
locality, and that the builder will pass along to those people the costs
of the parks and the schools, and will thus spread the cost among the
residents in the community who stand to benefit most from the
facilities. Builders argue that this overlooks the economic realities
of the situation. Most builders are not able to pass along extra costs
to prospective purchasers because of the tremendous competition in
the building industry today. With increasing mobility, the average
home buyer today will range from ten to thirty miles in his search
for a home, and has no trouble at all in finding areas where such
conditions are not imposed and the prices of the houses are correspondingly lower.
NEW LEGISLATION

A 1965 addition to the Subdivision Map Act permits a city or
a county to require a subdivider to sell land to the local elementary
school district at the subdivider's "cost." This property is to be used
for school purposes where a subdivision of more than 400 units is
completed within the same school district, on contiguous parcels,
owned by the same subdivider, within three years. 9 Another 1965
addition to the Subdivision Map Act permits a city or a county to
require by ordinance the dedication of land or payment of fees in lieu
thereof for park or recreational purposes as a condition of the approval of a subdivision map. However, the amount and location of
land to be dedicated or fees to be paid shall bear a reasonable relationship to the use of the park by the inhabitants of the subdivision.4"
Business and Professions Code Section 11510 was amended at the
same time to add to the definition of "design and improvement" the
dedication of land for parks.
Both bills contain language which carefully relates the requirements of dedication of land or payment of fees as closely as possible
to the needs of the subdivision. This, presumably, is to counter the
obvious argument of deprivation of property without just compensation. The argument is that reasonable restrictions can be imposed
39 CAL. Bus.
40 CAL. Bus.

& PROF.
& PROF.

CODE §
CODE §

11525.2.
11546.
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upon a privilege (subdividing land) for the general welfare of the
people. However, it would seem to a discerning eye that the authors
of this legislation are not so much concerned with equitably spreading the burden of schools and parks among the potential users, as
with enhancing the ability of cities or counties to carry out land
development and land use plans. There is a pre-existing system for
equitably distributing the burdens and responsibilities of providing
parks, schools, and other public facilities, namely the use of government funds derived from taxes to purchase private property.
City planners will argue that if they have to wait until funds
and plans are completed all available land will have
available
are
been gobbled up by hungry subdividers, and that acquisition of
school and park sites will require purchase of improved lands at a
tremendous expense to the taxpayers. The filing of a subdivision
map presents the city with an opportunity to immediately accomplish a long-range objective in that particular locality at a great
saving in funds if this legislation stands the test of constitutionality.
One might ask why a city should delay the planning of a school
or park until after a subdivision map is filed. From a long-range
planning viewpoint, would it not make more sense for the city to
develop an overall plan for the location of schools, parks, flood control facilities, and not to be dependent upon the haphazard or fortuitous filing of subdivision maps? Would it not make more sense for
the cities to utilize their facilities to plan overall development of
areas, to budget funds, and to secure passage of bond issues (where
necessary) for the purchase of undeveloped land before it is acquired
by subdividers?
With the controls that cities have over zoning, they should be
able to guide the future development of areas within their boundaries
in such a way as to efficiently integrate the park sites, school sites,
and drainage facilities which are planned and purchased. It would
also seem that this more conventional method of city development
would avoid the inevitable battle which will loom in every case
where requirements under the proposed bills are imposed. This
battle will be waged over the reasonableness of the conditions imposed on each particular subdivision, and the resulting constitutional
questions of taking without compensation and denial of equal protection of the laws. The next inquiry follows logically: once certain
conditions have been imposed upon a subdivider, what remedies are
open to him?
REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED SUBDIVIDERS

Business and Professions Code Section 11552 provides an administrative remedy, whereby a subdivider who is dissatisfied with
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the action of an advisory agency (such as a planning commission)
as to his tentative map may, within 15 days after such action, appeal
to the governing body for a public hearing. The hearing shall take
place within 15 days, and the decision must be rendered within seven
days thereafter.
Prior to 1965, Section 11525 of the Business and Professions
Code provided that any subdivider aggrieved by the decision of a
governing body "may within 90 days" bring a special proceeding in
the superior court to determine the reasonableness of the decision.
In 1965, Section 11525.1 was added providing that any action to
attach or review a decision of the governing body concerning a subdivision, or the reasonableness of any condition, must be commenced
within 180 days after the date of the decision. Also added in 1965
was Section 65850 of the Government Code, which requires the same
period for review with respect to any decision of an administrative
agency.
An interesting question arises if a subdivider who is dissatisfied
with a condition imposed upon him, complies with the condition
(after protesting it), and then (after filing a claim) brings an action
in the superior court against the city for damages in inverse condemnation or for return of fees paid under protest and for declaratory relief. Must a subdivider appeal a decision requiring an unreasonable dedication or payment of fees when the condition is first
imposed by the planning commission or advisory body of the city and
must there then be a hearing before the city council on the question
of the reasonableness of the condition before he is entitled to sue the
city in inverse condemnation? The City of Fremont"- argued that the
special proceedings provided for by the Subdivision Map Act must
be pursued to completion by a subdivider and that a decision of the
superior court that the condition is unreasonable should be obtained
before suit may be brought for inverse condemnation. The city lost
the argument and it is suspected that Section 11525.1 was passed at
the request of local governmental agencies to strengthen their hand
in this area.
The most reasonable interpretation of Section 11525 prior to
1965 would appear to be that the remedy is permissive, not mandatory. Since the remedy provided is judicial, not administrative, the
rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies would not
apply.
The 1965 amendment substitutes "shall" for "may," and thus
41 D. V. Builders, Inc. v. City of Fremont, Civil No. 329687, Super. Ct.,
Alameda

County, Calif., Feb. 5, 1963.
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requires a subdivider to bring a special proceeding in superior court
within 180 days after the decision of a governing body. The probable
motive of the sponsors of this legislation was to prevent a subdivider
from being able to sue a city in inverse condemnation for taking of
his land, or to sue for refund of fees paid into a park fund, unless the
subdivider first had brought such a proceeding and the city had then
insisted upon imposing the condition after the superior court had
determined that it was unreasonable or invalid. Due to the time
normally required to obtain judicial relief, the amendment could
effectively prevent challenge by aggrieved subdividers of all but the
most outrageously unreasonable conditions. Few builders can afford
to hold up their land development plans even for a few months to
await the outcome of such a hearing. The result would force acquiescence with the conditions in almost all cases.
One might speculate on what would happen to a builder who
complied with a condition imposed by a planning commission and
brought his action under Section 11525.1. Assume that he brought a
suit within 180 days for inverse condemnation and for return of fees,
having appealed unsuccessfully to the local governing body after
imposition of the condition by the planning commission or advisory
agency. Would he be permitted to proceed simultaneously with his
map and his suit? If so, no time would be lost if his suit were unsuccessful or he would get judgment for return of the fees, or payment of the fair market value of his land, in the event the court
decided in his favor.
To permit these parallel remedies would certainly temper the
rulings of local governing bodies which do not wish to impose conditions that may turn out to be illegal after it is too late to revoke
them. One also might argue that good administrative law would not
permit such a course of action.
However, in balance, it would seem just to permit the subdivider to proceed in this fashion. To deny him this right would
mean virtual absolute control by local government because of the
economic pressures on the builders and the "law's delay." It does
seem harsh or unreasonable to make local government assume the
risks of imposing conditions which turn out to be illegal.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The doctrine of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" provides simply that an individual must follow available administrative
procedures for resolving grievances before dragging a governmental
agency into court. The alleged purpose of the rule is to insure that
governmental agencies are not brought into court until all possibili-
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ties for settlement or compromise have been first exhausted. This
will save time and money of the city and of the courts, and will
benefit the taxpayers. The essence of the rule is that the governing
body of the particular entity involved should have the opportunity to
consider all the facts in a controversy and make a judgment upon the
merits before the matter is presented to a court.
There are some exceptions to the rule. For example, where a
litigant alleges that the action which was taken by a governmental
entity was completely illegal and without any authority whatsoever,
he need not exhaust any administrative remedies.42 It can also be
argued that the doctrine does not apply to judicial remedies, and
that Business and Professions Code Section 11525.1 is a judicial
remedy.
It would seem, therefore, that under the present law a subdivider should be able to bring a proceeding under Business and
Professions Code Section 11525.1 including a suit for inverse condemnation or return of fees, and at the same time seek declaratory relief.
He should, however, take care to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by local ordinances and by Business and Professions
Code Section 11525.1 before seeking a judicial remedy. Although his
case may present an exception to the rule of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the subdivider is much better off
if he has eliminated this doctrine from the issues in the lawsuit before going to court.
LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES

In addition to the Subdivision Map Act remedies, other local
remedies may have been added by municipal ordinances of the
particular city involved. A city ordinance may provide for the filing
of a petition by the builder to the planning commission or the council in the event a condition is imposed which the builder deems
unreasonable.
When faced with such additional local administrative remedies
provided by city ordinances, the cautious subdivider will take pains
to pursue each one in order to avoid falling into the trap of failing to
exhaust his administrative remedies. On the other hand, it may be
urged at this point that any such additional remedies provided by
local ordinances are unconstitutional because they conflict with the
Subdivision Map Act through which the state has occupied the field.
Otherwise, it would be very easy for a city to completely circumvent
the Subdivision Map Act by providing a myriad of burdensome and
42 See 2 CAL. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 185 (1952).
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annoying local administrative remedies which would have to be completed before a subdivider could bring his case into court.
OTHER

REMEDIES

The question arises whether there are any remedies open to the
subdivider other than those provided by local ordinances and by the
Subdivision Map Act. The answer is that there are other remedies
open, and that under certain circumstances, these other remedies
may be the only proper ones. In Wine v. City Council of Los
Angeles," conditions imposed by the city were challenged by the subdivider and were held not to be within the control of the city council
because the conditions were not part of the "design" or "improvement" of the subdivision. Therefore, the conditions were outside of
the authority of the Subdivision Map Act and no challenge to the
reasonableness of the conditions imposed by the council was thereby
authorized. The Wine case puts the subdivider who is contesting the
validity of conditions imposed under the Subdivision Map Act in
somewhat of a dilemma. If he proceeds to bring a statutory action
with 180 days under Section 11525.1, he may find that the Wine
case will prevent him from obtaining relief where his cause of action
is based upon the assertion that the city has exceeded the authority
delegated to it by the Subdivision Map Act. If, on the other hand,
the subdivider brings an action for inverse condemnation or declaratory relief, and does not follow the procedures set up by Section
11552 and Section 11525.1, he risks having his case thrown out of
court for failing to exhaust the administrative remedies provided,
unless he could successfully argue that Section 11525.1 provides a
judicial remedy which would not come within the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Declaratory relief is also provided for by California law." The
subdivider should be able to file a declaratory relief action where the
city attempts to impose an allegedly unauthorized condition, and
have the court declare it valid or invalid. Section 11525.1 would
seem to require this action to be commenced within 180 days.
FINALITY OF DEDICATION

The question which arises in the case of a subdivider who
proceeds with his maps, construction and dedication, where required, and at the same time pursues his administrative remedies, is
whether the dedication is irrevocable. It has been said that a gift or
43 177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 2 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1960).
44 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.

§

1060.
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dedication of land to a city is irrevocable," unless made under
duress."' It might be argued that acceptance of the benefits of subdivision would create an estoppel and prevent the subdivider from recovering property, dedication of which had been required and completed. This argument, however, would appear to be without basis in
law. A subdivider is entitled to exercise the privilege of subdividing
his property, provided he meets certain reasonable conditions which
are legally imposed for the benefit of all of the people. It would not
be logical to argue that the subdivider can be required to submit
to unreasonable and illegal conditions in return for receiving the
privilege of subdividing his property.
Another argument that cities tend to make is that a subdivider
who buys property, knowing that a portion of the property may be
required for a flood control channel or a park or a school, walks into
the situation with his eyes wide open. Therefore, there is no economic hardship to him because he knew all along what such requirements might be. This argument is also without merit. One does
not waive his rights to complain about an illegal condition simply
because he knew in advance that there was a chance that such a
condition might be imposed.
It is also argued that a subdivider who enters into a subdivision
improvement agreement with a city after notification of a condition,
and signs a contract calling for installation of improvements, has
waived his right to complain about the condition. The argument is
also ineffective because the contract for subdivision improvements is
in no way related to the condition of dedication of land for a channel or park. If the subdivider has met all the requirements legally
imposed by the city, and is in a position to enter into an agreement
required by the city for the construction of subdivision improvements, the city cannot require him to waive his constitutional rights
to compensation for property taken for public purpose. It also might
be argued that Business and Professions Code Section 11627, which
says that recording of a final map ultimately determines the validity
of the map, would prevent a subdivider from getting his money back
after his final map is recorded. This would not be a reasonable interpretation of the statute, however, because it seems limited to the
question of validity of the map itself, without regard for conditions
imposed.
CLAIMS STATUTES

Local municipal ordinances may provide their own claim statutes and, where applicable, these should be studied carefully in the
45 Brick v. Cazaux, 9 Cal. 2d 549, 71 P.2d 588 (1937).

46 Newport Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 797 (1962).
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event that the subdivider has completed the dedication of land and
is suing in inverse condemnation.
Under state law a claim must be presented in writing to a city;
that claim must be rejected before a suit can be filed for money
damages, and suit must be filed within six months after the facts
giving rise to the claim occur.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The average subdivider or builder is under considerable time
pressure to get his tentative and final maps approved as quickly as
possible so that he can begin moving dirt, installing improvements,
and building his model homes. The average time from filing of a
tentative map to approval of a final map is less than four months
(depending upon the area). The time it takes to resolve a case,
whether one for declaratory relief, inverse condemnation, or one
brought under Section 11525 of the Business and Professions Code,
is no doubt considerably longer. In the Sunnyvale case,4 the complaint was filed in October 1963, and the case was finally settled in
January 1965, after it had been scheduled to go to trial in December
of 1964. Theoretically, it would be possible to get a case to trial in
much less time than that, but as a practical matter, almost any case
of that nature would be fairly complex, and it would require a considerable amount of time to complete law and motion matters, discovery matters, and pretrial. If the subdivider wins he may have to
respond to an appeal. No subdivider can stand that kind of delay.
Subdividers are faced with economic problems of paying both taxes
and interest on borrowed capital, meeting overhead, and living up to
contracts with construction crews, subcontractors and materialmen.
They cannot afford to wait for justice to take its course and must,
therefore, proceed to subdivide the property and struggle along as
best they can under the conditions that are imposed. At the same
time, they may be forced to protect their rights by litigating these
conditions through the courts, if necessary.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

What is really needed is a faster means of educating the public
to recognize the need for improved governmental services in certain
areas. In 1955, the electorate of the North Central Zone of the Santa
Clara Flood Control and Water Conservation District failed to pass
47 CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 945.4, 945.6.

Ripley Dev. Co. v. City of Sunnyvale & Santa Clara County Flood Control &
Water Conservation Dist., Civil No. 150677, Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Calif.,
Oct. 24, 1963.
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a bond issue which was intended to finance several very important
flood control channels. Engineering studies had shown that these
were needed in the area. The electorate was not educated to the
necessity for these improvements and failed to approve the bonds.
This apparently did not stop the district from going ahead with its
plan, however, as pointed out.4" Would it be unjust to label such
action "paternalistic"? On the other hand, would it be better to let
people suffer for their mistakes until they learn for themselves, even
if it costs more in the long run? Is it good policy for few people who
are in positions of control over long range planning to decide what is
best for the rest of the people? Policies may be executed to carry
out these decisions without consulting the electorate, with the assumption that the people are not interested or have not the intelligence to make proper decisions.
Legislation has been enacted to broaden the power of cities to
impose requirements under the Subdivision Map Act, and to limit
the right to judicial review. It is submitted that any laws that permit
dedication of land for public purposes to be required without compensation will have to stand the test of constitutionality, i.e., are the
conditions imposed reasonable in terms of local or neighborhood
needs of the owners within the area of jurisdiction? In this connection, let us remember the quotation from Justice Holmes referred to
at the beginning of this article.
The subdivider who desires to avoid payment of illegal fees or
dedication of property for public purposes in connection with approval of his subdivision maps should protest the conditions at all
levels, take pains to exhaust all local and state administrative remedies, comply with all claims statutes, and then bring his action
within the time limits set by the Subdivision Map Act for declaratory relief and inverse condemnation, or return of fees, where applicable. In the meantime, he should proceed with his maps as required,
including dedicating or reserving property for other than subdivision
use, after having been sure to appear and protest at all public meetings where the imposition of the conditions or the approval of his
maps were discussed. In the event the conditions are determined to
be reasonable and valid, the subdivider will not have lost valuable
time by waiting for a legal decision which may take months or
years. If the court rules in his favor, he will have completed his
subdivision and will not have been penalized for seeking justice in
the courts. He will be able to recover a judgment in inverse condemnation in the event of forced dedication or a judgment for return of
fees, the deposit of which was required as a condition to approval of
his map.
49
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Some builders question whether they may not harm themselves
in the long run by fighting the imposition of conditions because of
the loss of good will of the local governmental entities. It is well
known that there is a lot of room for the exercise of "administrative
judgment" at all levels in city and county governments. It is also
quite possible that one or more planning or other administrative
officials within a city could seriously hinder the operations of any
one builder by continually finding ways to delay or impede the progress of the builder when his plans come before the city for consideration. This has been the fear of a considerable number of
builders who have been faced with the imposition of unreasonable
conditions, but have convinced themselves that there is more to be
lost than to be gained from fighting the problem. They have given
up. It is submitted that a reputable and efficient builder who finds
himself faced with the imposition of an unreasonable condition will
not be significantly penalized by local administrative governmental
officials if he chooses to properly follow his administrative and legal
remedies in a straightforward and friendly manner. In fact, the
reverse is likely to be true in that the local governmental officials
may develop a greater respect for the subdivider when they learn
that he will stand up for his rights and is not one to be easily pushed
around. In case the builder runs into a "bad apple" who might take
things personally and go on a crusade to impede the progress of
that builder, there are other means to combat such unlawful conduct. In any event, the subdivider who merely acquiesces to unwarranted conditions is merely encouraging continued coercion, indirect
as it may be, by local government.

